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With its resort to data technologies, powerful enforcement machinery, and
proclaimed goal of morality enhancement, the Social Credit System (SCS) emerges
as a novelty. It captures the imagination of algorithms and a refreshed fear, or hope,
of social engineering. The SCS differs from China’s existing mode of governance
that operates primarily through a formal legal system. Early investigations of
the impact of the differences share a preoccupation with technology.1)The SCS’
ramifications for privacy and reputation through the medium of datafication have
been analysed. See Chen, Yongxi & Cheung, Anne S. Y. (2017) The Transparent
Self Under Big Data Profiling: Privacy and Chinese Legislation on the Social
Credit System. The Journal of Comparative Law, 12(2), 356-377; Dai, Xin. (2018)
Toward a Reputation State: The Social Credit System Project of China, SSRN. The
philosophical dimensions of those differences await exploration,2)The difficulties in
separating the role of social credit as a set of (neutral) techniques and as a means
of advancing ideological principles are insightfully addressed in Backer, Larry Catá.
(2018) Next Generation Law: Data Driven Governance and Accountability Based
Regulatory Systems in the West, and Social Credit Regimes in China, SSRN.
which this series of online debate timely addresses. While it is certainly beneficial to
contrast the SCS to emerging governance mechanisms in the West or principles of
civil liberties, it is equally important to connect it to traditional Chinese thought which
may have influenced the policy-makers. In view of the tendency of associating the
SCS with Confucianism, this blog post concentrates on fajia (legalism), a traditional
school of political and legal thought that had shaped the mode of governance
in imperial China. Given the intricacy of Legalism, discussions here would be
unsatisfactorily sketchy, leaving questions to elaborate in a full-length paper. It
is nevertheless worth taking this inward and retrospective approach to highlight
problems in the SCS that may be overlooked under a futuristic and de-contextualised
perspective.
Data technologies do not necessarily revolutionise the regulation of behaviours.
They can also facilitate the realisation of aspirations for social control that are
encapsulated by Legalism. As a major rival to Confucianism, Legalism advocates
radical state control of the society and the primacy of criminal law as a means for
upholding autocratic order. In addition to being the ideology in Qin (initially the
strongest state in the Warring States period [cir. 500 – 221 BC] which became
the first unitary dynasty [221 – 207 BC])), Legalism had guided and sustained the
operation of legal systems throughout the two-thousand-year-old dynastic era,3)See
for example Chang, Wejen. (2016) In Search of The Way: Legal Philosophy of
the Classic Chinese Thinkers. Edinburgh University Press, 473-510. but also has
remained a source of inspiration for revolutionists who wished to wield state powers
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to forge a social order in line with their respective ideals. Meanwhile, Legalism has
been widely criticised in ancient and modern time because of the repressive and
manipulative consequences of its measures. If ‘dystopian’ implies a categorical
disregard of individuals’ core interests in pursuit of the ideals of a collectivity,
Legalists can be regarded as embracing a dystopia, though their thoughts are
indigenous. Insofar as there is a close affinity between core features of the SCS and
Legalist tenets, as will be analysed below, the system is more like a déjà vu than a
futuristic sue genesis. 
Expansion of State Interference
The SCS is characterised by subjecting a great variety of conducts to state
interference. The malleable concept of ‘trustworthiness’ is used to assess not only
economic conducts (grouped mainly under the category of ‘business integrity’ of
the 2014 SCS Outline), but also the discharges of social commitments, in particular
professional activities in the sectors of healthcare, education, research, culture and
even NGO operation (grouped under the obscure category of ‘societal integrity’).
The assessments extend to the fields of morality – such as charity and etiquette in
social life – and further cover an individual’s online activities, though it is doubtful
whether all those activities affect other parties. A substantial part of the enumerated
conducts is regulated by autonomous norms that do not derive from the state’s
will, such as professional ethics and moral principles. The SCS has substituted
the autonomous norms for state standards of assessment. Furthermore, it urges
different communities to take restrictive measures against their members which are
officially rated as “seriously untrustworthy” according to the state standards, despite
that the abstract trustworthiness is not the same as the specific quality of financial
credibility (xinyong), promise-keeping ability (shouxin) or integrity (chengxin) that is
voluntarily evaluated by the communities according to the business, professional or
moral context concerned. State standards thus override spontaneous self-regulation.
This heightened extent of state interference is not consistent with Confucianism
that separates moral principles and rites (li) from executive orders and insists on
the supremacy of the former. Instead, it is supported by Legalism which advocates
concentrating powers in the hands of the ruler. According to Legalists, the sovereign
should put all behaviours of the subjects, including speeches, under surveillance and
modulation to achieve the reform goals of making the kingdom wealthy and army
strong. The most effective means is fa, i.e., rules promulgated by the authorities to
prohibit the subjects from doing wrong. Fa should override rites, customs and other
norms, as the latter are not necessarily compatible with the ruler’s goals. This tenet
of unifying regulatory powers under fa was implemented in Qin to the limit allowed
by the technology of the time. With datafication and rising computational capacities,
the Chinese state of today is better able to detect each citizen’s behaviours and set
behavioural standards according to changing policy priorities. It can thus reclaim
its supervision of individuals which has been weakened due to the marketisation
process. Meanwhile, segments of the civil society barely have adequate resources to
implement self-regulation norms that are inconsistent with state standards.
Stress on Disproportionate Punishment
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Another feature of the SCS is building into the standards of conduct an incentivising
mechanism called ‘joint punishments and rewards’. In a nutshell, an individual
whose conduct is ranked at a given level of trustworthiness may suffer sanctions
concurrently imposed by different authorities or social entities, or obtain rewards
offered by them, like ripple effects.
However, the mechanism is tilted towards punishment and is often disproportionate.
Among the inter-ministerial memorandums about different sectors of social credit,
38 were joint punishment measures and only 5 were joint rewards. Credit China, the
national portal of the SCS, publishes monthly releases about the persons subject to
joint punishments but rarely provides updates on joint rewards.
Joint punishments, as currently prescribed, distance from the just deserts principle
that is repeatedly evoked to justify the SCS. The infliction of punishment is based on
the ‘trustworthiness’ of a targeted infraction, different from the legal liability for the
infraction. The trustworthiness assessment virtually reduces infractions of different
natures to uni-dimensional and hierarchical positions. This de-contextualised
approach affects the relevance and commensuration of punishment. First,
relevance is sometimes difficult to see between an infraction in Sector A and the
punishments ‘jointly’ inflicted by an authority regulating Sector B. For instance,
under the Memorandum on Joint Punishments concerning Untrustworthy Persons
in Marriage Registration, an individual who makes false statements about his or her
consanguineous relation with the spouse should be barred from registering his or
her enterprise as an ‘Authorised Economic Operator’ with the customs authority.
The relationship is obscure between a business entity’s conducts pertaining to the
customs code and its legal representative’s breach of eugenic policies. Second,
severe punishments may apply indiscriminately to infractions of different gravity.
For example, ‘seriously untrustworthy’ people excluded from high-speed trains
encompass not only those who have refused to pay overdue debts as ordered by the
courts, but also persons in charge of the social security service providers (such as
hospitals) which have violated service agreements, and those who have been fined
for smoking in rail-cars. It is questionable whether the three kinds of infractions share
the same shade of intent or have similarly serious consequences. 
The SCS’s extraordinary emphasis on punishment is distinct from Confucianism,
which prioritises moral education to punishment and generally disapproves
excessive penalties. It resonates instead with Legalist tenets. First, while the
Legalists hold fa as the paramount rules, they equate fa with punitive norms. The
equation derives from their philosophy that men are essentially evil and that men
can be made to act as the ruler wishes only through punishment and reward. The
ruler should wield punishments much more than rewards due to the wicked nature
of men. Second, Legalism insists that punishments should be numerous and harsh
to deter audacious and calculating men from committing less serious offences. The
two tenets were followed in different periods of the imperial era, perpetuating the
central role of criminal law and imposition of draconian penalties. Under the SCS, the
sharing of credit data across sectors and regions would automate the enforcement
of punishment, elevating the deterring effects to a speed and scale that the Legalists
would aspire to.
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‘Convergence of Confucianism and Legalism’
State monopoly of the defining power of ‘trustworthiness’ and heavy reliance
on punishment are two essential mechanisms of the Social Credit System. This
finding does not negate that the SCS embraces a goal (among others) of morality
enhancement. The mechanisms operate despite that goal. Paradoxical as the co-
existence seems, it was not new to imperial China. The traditional Chinese political
and legal system can be characterised by the ‘convergence of Confucianism and
Legalism’.4)See generally Zhao, Dingxin. (2015). The Confucian-Legalist State:
A New Theory of Chinese History. Oxford University Press, 14-15. For instance,
‘making penalties explicit to assist [moral] education’ (ming xing bi jiao, ####) was
the professed ideology of the founding emperor of Ming (1368-1662), but led to
the transformation of moral suasion into numerous rigours laws and extensive
deployment of harsh penalties, rendering the rulers increasingly despotic. Today, the
instrumentalist mixed use of Confucianism and Legalism can emerge in a different
context. The two mechanisms, if unchecked, would have oppressive ramifications
with which Chinese historians are familiar. The SCS’s future hinges not so much on
how progressive the promoted morality is, but mainly on how the arbitrary definition
of trustworthiness can be controlled and what remedies can be sought by citizens
subject to joint punishments. It also depends on the extent to which the policy-
makers have escaped the culturally ingrained Legalist temptation, i.e., absolutizing
state power.
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